I. Introduction
These remarks are intended as a rough survey of the array of things which Charles McCoy has been concerned with as a Christian theologian and moral philosopher, educator and lively human being now in his seventy fourth year. I am particularly interested in commenting upon the ways in which the philosophical ideas of Michael Polanyi have been taken up and creatively recast in his own context by McCoy. Most of the readers of these words will know Charles McCoy through his long involvement with the Polanyi Society. Although I focus upon McCoy's ideas, at the outset, it should be clear that ideas are not separate from action. Certainly in McCoy's case, his thoughtful life has been that of a change agent, one informed and inflamed by the ideas and the images valent in his history. Nor are McCoy's ideas and engagements, I am sure he would say, to be conceived as narrowly or privately his own in ways the Cartesian and later the Romantic traditions sometimes have taught us to think about persons. McCoy always insists, with one of his favorite teachers Johannes Althusius, that persons foremost are symbiotes, 1 social companions existing in and constituted by interdependence. McCoy's life and work reflect his immersion in a social location; he has been a participant in a social conversation which includes not only his predecessors and contemporaries, but is directed toward those who will come after us. I begin by noting a few biographical details and weaving with them a broadly contoured map of McCoy's interests and endeavors. I identify McCoy's work as falling largely into three areas: religion and higher education, theology, and ethics. To be sure, such a mapping does not pick up some important things such as McCoy's ongoing interest in the arts. Nevertheless, my gross effort at representation does set forth some useful markers.
II. Three Areas of Work
McCoy was born a southerner, a North Carolinian, and it is to those roots that he regularly returns; he was first educated in North Carolina schools and the university and then went to seminary at Duke University. As an undergraduate, he first became actively involved with the civil rights movement, and this has been an important commitment in his life and writing, both early and late. McCoy went to Yale for Ph. D. study; although he worked with many others, H. Richard Niebuhr and Robert Calhoun were his chief mentors. His focal area was theological ethics in the modern period, but he wanted a dissertation topic that related theological ethics to the Bible. Niebuhr suggested, and Calhoun concurred, that McCoy consider a study of the seventeenth century federalist theology of the Dutch figure Cocceius. In his dissertation work in the mid fifties, McCoy rediscovered and began to mine federalist theology and covenantal perspectives; he has worked within the context of federalist or covenantal metaphors since his graduate education. It is fair to say that covenantal thought is McCoy's chief resource; it informs his reflection in every area in which he has worked and most especially his theological reflection. However, it is certainly also the case, as I discuss below, that covenantal perspectives are always blended seamlessly and creatively with influences from Plato, H. Richard Niebuhr and Polanyi, three additional primary influences.
McCoy spent a few years on the faculty at the University of Florida as his graduate education concluded. It was here at the suggestion of an economist friend, that he first read Polanyi's writing. He later discussed Polanyi's importance with Calhoun and Niebuhr and followed up, after the publication of Personal Knowledge in 1958, with further Polanyi study. In 1959, McCoy came to Pacific School of Religion, in Berkeley, where the temperature was moderated by the fog, but the real air was heady and invigorating. He remained for over thirty years teaching at Pacific School of Religion and the Graduate Theological Union, which he helped to organize, and working on various projects with University of California faculty as well as business, political and religious leaders and institutions in the Bay Area and across the nation. Classes on Polanyi, Niebuhr, Plato and covenantal theology were in his regular cycle of courses.
Although it is difficult succinctly to summarize the issues McCoy worked on at Florida and in the early years at Pacific School of Religion, it is fair to say that religion and higher education was an important topic in his early career which McCoy studied and wrote about. I need only to reference his work here since Richard Gelwick's essay in this issue covers this area. McCoy came to Pacific School of Religion as a specialist in religion and higher education, but his interests even in this specialty spilled out in several directions. He was interested in the ways in which the Christian church could work on campus; he was interested in the place of church-related colleges in the broader fabric of higher education. With Neely McCarter, in 1959, he wrote an early book, The Gospel on Campus, 2 and a second book in 1972, The Responsible Campus. 3 McCoy was involved with campus ministry nationally and in Berkeley in the sixties and seventies. He was interested in theological education and its reform throughout his career. He was deeply involved in ecumenical ventures and was a figure who pushed for the ecumenical educational experiment that came to be the Graduate Theological Union in the sixties.
Not entirely independent of religion and higher education issues are other concerns that might be dubbed more explicitly theological. Below I have more that is concrete to say about McCoy's theological ideas, but here their general context needs some attention. From early in his career, McCoy has struggled to articulate the character of religion and the nature of theological analysis. On one hand, the attempt has been to fashion a broad based understanding that will make clear to the contemporary secular academy that theology still belongs in the university and is still enormously useful for understanding human vitality in its diversity. On the other hand, McCoy's writing about theology from the fifties to the present has often rather bluntly criticized many other Christian theological approaches as misguided. Many Christian thinkers have, unfortunately, thought that only Christians do theology and this orientation royally irritated McCoy for an entire career: . . . .to limit theology to the Christian community involves a misunderstanding of the theological task, a misunderstanding that poses serious problems for the Christian scholar seeking to relate his own reflection to the thought of other scholars. 4 Much Christian theology has long been embarrassingly unhistorical and too ready to jump on fashionable philosophical bandwagons:
. . . it is precisely the theological task to recognize that man always views reality from a limited human perspective and is bound to interpret the whole of experience through some particular event or segment of experience which grasps him as revelatory, not through some supposedly universal consciousness. If this be true, many Christian theologians for the past two centuries have indeed sought escape from the scandal of particularity. Under the guise of openness, this escape has been attempted by taking a stance within some currently popular intellectual viewpoint and undertaking to prove that this standpoint provides the universally valid demonstration of Christianity ("MTR", 17).
As this quotation makes clear, McCoy's views about theology and religion fall generally within the furrows first plowed by his teacher H. Richard Niebuhr. There is a consistent emphasis upon the social or communal, the historical and traditional, and the experiential, the remembered and anticipated as mediated through the symbolic. In several ways, Niebuhrian theology has not been well understood or fared well in recent history. Some Niebuhrian elements long emphasized by McCoy, for example, the importance of social location, have now been prudentially absorbed into much theology and religious studies in our obviously pluralistic environment. But the constructive implications of Niebuhrian insights are not yet well worked out in theology and religious studies. Although it is not separate from his theological reflection, for purposes of clarity I have omitted above any comments on McCoy's work as an ethicist. Concern with ethics and writing on ethics has been a constant throughout his professional career, but clearly this work became central and focused from the early seventies forward. This was the point at which the Center for Ethics and Social Policy was established and the collaboration with Fred Twining and others began; this collaboration produced fruitful projects in business, healthcare, and politics (as well as other areas) and eventually led to establishment of other policy ethics centers. The core ideas of McCoy and his collaborators have passed into the normal idiom used now in much religious and philosophical ethical writing. Today it is common to hear ethicists speak about organizational ethics, but this was not the case in the mid seventies when the Center's work began. Perhaps more important than the voices of academic ethicists, are the voices of decision makers in some important large businesses who are no longer completely unsettled by talk about "ethics."
5 Part of McCoy's mission as an ethicist working with different groups has been to make ordinary people believe that ethics is a sensible, non esoteric reflective activity that persons and groups can and should do, even though it does not solve all problems. McCoy certainly respects the intricate and diverse traditions of philosophical and theological ethics, but he has not taught that everyone must know these by chapter and verse; to do ethics seriously has not meant, according to McCoy, to become an academic ethicist. Also McCoy has especially emphasized that ethical reflection can and needs to take place at different levels: "As reflection on the moral significance of human action, ethics takes place on different levels of agency." 6 Analysis must recognize and focus on the several different levels of comprehensiveness: it can attend to individual agents, but also to organizational or institutional agents, to social sectors or professions , and ultimately to a total society. About much of McCoy's work in ethics there has been a note of common sense and an orientation to the non specialist. This has not always garnered praise in the academy.
Much of McCoy 's ethics work has emphasized the power of organizations in contemporary society. To take organizational power seriously has meant, for McCoy, taking the complexities of organizations and the importance of policy more seriously. But the study of organizations and the attempt to affect policy, according to McCoy, is not a domain that academic ethicists can readily enter assuming they know the territory and can call the shots. The Center's work called for a "triadic approach" 7 which brought together ethicists, social scientists and experienced organizational policy makers; this novel approach (grounded in McCoy's federalist orientation) is centrally important to organizational ethics, although that importance remains little understood. No single group has a privileged perspective and each group can learn from the skills of others; perspectival commitments are bound together and need each other in a dynamic process.
In McCoy's reading, the politics of the sixties and early seventies often emphasized social responsibility, but did not focus clearly enough on organizational decision making. The projects of the Center and the writing of McCoy and his collaborators zeroed in on ethics in policy formation. The policy making process requires not only financial inputs, but also a broad range of information concerned with social issues and the political environment of organizational action. Organizations need a feedback process which monitors the social environment and sponsors genuine discussion, at several levels in the organization, of social impacts of policy options. In an early publication, McCoy (and his collaborators) spoke of a "comprehensive ethic" (ECPP) for corporate policy which balanced institutional self -interest, responsibilities to multiple constituencies and social vision. In sum, McCoy's work as a ethicist has been creatively attentive to organizational action and to the ways in which ethical reflection can be institutionalized in the organizational decision making process.
Finally, it is of some importance to note (with painful brevity) that McCoy's work in ethics does draw upon Niebuhr's cathekontic ethics or ethics of the fitting. Like his teacher, McCoy acknowledges his own identity as a Christian moral philosopher or social ethicist. This implies that the model for responsible or fitting action for McCoy is understood as response to the ongoing action of the God known in Christian history. That is, God is present and active among us and it is the Christian's tricky business to discern the challenging, changing requirements of loyalty. Those within the Christian fold always find themselves both engaged in repentance for our idolatries and called to commitments involving cooperation with God's on-going liberating activity which is moving toward a consummation.
III Four Influences
I can give somewhat more definitive character to McCoy's post-critical thinking by examining the ways in which he appropriates what I have above termed the four principle influences which are woven together in his ideas: a reading of Plato, the thought of H. R. Niebuhr, federalist or covenantal theological ideas and Michael Polanyi's philosophical perspective. By briefly treating each of these different elements, I hope to show how they flow together and constitute McCoy's reflective orientation.
Plato
McCoy readily acknowledges that the problems Plato sets and the directions in which he approaches solutions have always intrigued him. In many senses, McCoy interprets all of Plato through the so-called early dialogs. He is concerned to avoid a fundamentalist or overly literalist approach to Plato's perspective. McCoy recognizes the dialog form (best evident in early work) as not merely literary but as constitutive of Plato's approach and convictions. It implies a community with implicit covenants and a framework for exploration. Further, it implies, as Polanyi also emphasizes, that inquiry is important; there is a covenant to pursue the unknown. Communal belief or existing covenants are the ground for exploration; language is the medium through which we explain that which we believe is real in the community and through which further exploration proceeds. Those who inquire must presuppose the possibility of something in order to inquire and speak about it; but to presuppose something doesn't mean that it is a reality. McCoy holds that Plato was not very literal about the forms, but that Plato was, as a dialectician, an astute student of dynamic part-whole relationships. McCoy socially contextualizes Plato and, as I have implied, he wants to link Plato, Polanyi, Niebuhr and federalist theology. To mention just one of these complements, Polanyi's ideas about skills and their acquisition, tacit integration, the convivial and passionate moorings of inquiry, his emphasis upon discovery, comprehensive entities and particulars-at least all of these Polanyian elements-are put to service to socially contextualize Plato.
H. Richard Niebuhr
Above, I have noted that Niebuhr was one of McCoy's important teachers and that McCoy's thought takes his point of departure from Niebuhr's consistent emphasis upon the social or communal, the historical and traditional, and the experiential, the remembered and anticipated as mediated through the symbolic. McCoy's thinking about what religion is and what theology is, as well as his efforts to do constructive Christian theology, fall within the Niebuhrian paradigm, but it is a Niebuhrian paradigm recast in federalist and Polanyian ways (one might plausibly argue that Niebuhr already loosely fits within the federalist paradigm) .
Students of McCoy often recall his regular and provocative class comment that Niebuhr's The Meaning of
Revelation will likely be the most important book in theology in the twentieth century. 8 Like Niebuhr, McCoy's writing always emphasizes the priority of faith in human affairs and the historical, revelational context of human faithfulness; faithful living is always in a particular interpretative community, a location with concrete centers of value and loyalty which are often in tension but are mediated through the valent stories and symbols and the lives of social companions. Religious faith, for McCoy, permeates or binds together elements of life. In When Gods Change, McCoy argues that one must look for human religiousness in the "most inclusive wholeness of human acting, intending , and believing", in what he dubs a "realm of actuality" ( WGC, 162). Religious faith "pervades a realm of actuality. A god is that reality believed in as shaping history and our realm of actuality" (WGC,162). McCoy contends that most ecclesiastical theology has long operated within the "Constantinian paradigm" (WGC,165) and has been unable to see the vibrant diversity of human faith and the plurality of gods. He suggests that phenomena, such as the emerging pluralism of global culture and the rise of deconstructionist thought, challenge Constantianian presumptions and will hopefully transform theology.
Like Niebuhr, McCoy has emphasized the plurality of faith as a human phenomenon; more than Niebuhr, McCoy has developed a vocabulary to discuss complex and changing patterns of loyalty and commitment. His federalist theology background and his absorption of a Polanyian framework for discussing persons and communities have been helpful in his work. McCoy describes the ways in which humans negotiate the web of meaning through which they live:
The context of meaning within which our earliest memories are set is cultural. It is meaning that belongs to the community before we arrive on the scene. We receive and respond to patterns existing before our appearance. Gradually we are inducted into this community of interpretations, and participate in revising its interpretations and passing them to subsequent arrivals.
The meaning already present is better understood not so much as propositions as valencies, commitments, love and loathing, warmth and tension. . . . . Meaning in this sense is not about differentiated parts of our world but rather is a field of force, an integrated wholeness of covenantal relations (WGC, 99).
McCoy carefully links and yet distinguishes meaning, experience, action and religious commitments:
As it binds the differentiated elements and levels of human action and actuality into wholes, religious commitment pervades human experiencing. But it is not identical with experience. What we are designating here as religious concerns the field of force ordering human action. . . . . Commitments of higher valency set the pattern of lesser commitments and thus reveal the believing and valuing of an action system. Religious faith is no more separable from human living than is design from a building (WGC, 194).
The place and character of gods McCoy describes as always bound up with directed human energies:
Deity is the comprehensive power believed in as linking events together in a meaningful whole, the sovereign reality of world occurrence, the power which, just as a magnet gives to iron filings the pattern of a magnetic field, shapes the fields of human commitments, loyalties and actions. As selfhood provides a center of experience, so deity means the reality and the pervasive valency of experiencing (WGC, 104).
Our gods are comprehensive entities in whom we believe; our gods form the "most comprehensive horizons of human commitment and identity" (WGC,204). As such, they are, at one and the same time, McCoy argues, projections of believers' aspirations, ultimate commitments that impel believers to break beyond the world of the status quo, and powerfully experienced "reality that breaks in upon us no less than we break out toward it" (WGC, 205).
Federalist Theology
The preceding discussion sketchily notes some ways in which McCoy's theological reflection creatively articulates and expands social and historical elements with which Niebuhr earlier wrestled. However, McCoy explicitly identifies his work in theology as operating within a "federal or covenantal paradigm. . ." (WGC, 171). For McCoy, his dissertation work on Cocceius and the federalist theological tradition convinced him that the covenant was a powerful root metaphor within which to organize the kind of social and historical approach to humanity on which he was already working. Federal theology and political philosophy are important for understanding the shape of modern societies, but McCoy believes that in many ways federalist or covenantal thinking extends beyond political philosophy and is second nature-although it is not recognized-within many modern societies. Contemporary accounts of "federalism" often fail to acknowledge the federalist theology and its richness. Discussions of "federalism" usually focus only upon political philosophy emphasizing division of powers and checks and balances. McCoy construes the federalist theology as much more inclusive: ". . . federalism understands the relationships between God and the world and among humans as based on covenants among their members, some tacit and inherited from the past, others explicit and made or renewed in the present" (FF, 12). The covenant root metaphor is one that combines attention to association or combination and levels of comprehensiveness: …the inner nature of social groups and the relationships among them are understood as covenantal by federalists. Primary social entities such as families, congregations, occupational guilds, and commercial organizations exist by virtue of the tacit and explicit compacts defining relations among members and committing participants to the group. More comprehensive social structures are based on compacts among less inclusive groups. In political organization, a town is made up of a compact among families, a province of a compact among towns, a commonwealth of a compact among provinces… . . . . The elements of voluntary participation, of the rights and responsibilities of membership, of commitment to the group and its patterns of governance, and of holding leaders to their covenanted obligations are central to a federal order whether ecclesiastical, economic, or political (FF,13).
In the federalist tradition, McCoy found what became his primary affirmation about the God known in Christian accounts: "In federal perspective, the most fundamental affirmation about God for Christians is that God is the Faithful One, who makes covenant and keeps covenant" (FF, 13). The sense of God as the Faithful One points to the way in which God is continually active and shaping the whole creation. Federalism has an emphasis upon process, according to McCoy's reading; federal orders are subject to redesign:
In federal theology this dynamic element is affirmed by viewing the creation of the world and humanity, not as complete, but as developing toward ever greater fulfillment within the unfolding economies of the covenant of God. God's covenant is not a static order but a pattern of changing relations in the world toward greater justice and love (FF,14).
Especially from Cocceius, McCoy draws fundamental ideas about who humans are and how they fit into the unfolding pattern of history and cosmos. Humans are sinful and our knowing is partial, but there is "social achievement resulting from the interaction of humans in covenant as God's grace works in the redeeming activity of historical process" (FF, 78). Nature, humans and history are part of a covenantal process moving "toward an unknown future and consummation in God" (FF, 78). Cocceius holds (and McCoy with him, in his late twentieth century rendition) that :
humans are created mutable, changeable, in process, open to the obedient love of God through which they have community with God and with one another. In the rebellion and disobedience that constitutes the fall into sin, humans become immutable, resistant to change, denying the process in which they were created that leads toward fulfillment in God (FF,78).
From these federalist ideas about human beings and history, comes McCoy's response to global diversity and historical change: "Pluralism is the complement, not the enemy, of liberation" (WGC, 211). McCoy reads the signs of history as on a course of liberation; this course is God's action but it is also human action or response. Liberation is always coupled with deeper insights into oppression:
. . . pluralism reminds us decisively of the multiple sources and shapes of oppression. Radical evil in history, radical sin in human life, take varied forms. Liberation continues, but new forms of oppression emerge. In part, every liberating achievement opens awareness to new horizons of oppression. In part, the forces of liberation in one generation buttress the oppressor of the next (WGC, 214).
It is the ongoing cycle of breaking out of oppression (Niebuhr's permanent revolution) that McCoy suggests is central to the Christian's sense of history and deity:
The remembered God of the covenant becomes the means for breaking out of oppressive sociopolitical-theological conditions toward more encompassing liberation and a more comprehensive conception of the covenant God (WGC, 218-219).
Michael Polanyi
Those familiar with Michael Polanyi's ideas will undoubtedly already have noticed, in the quotations from McCoy's writing used above, that often McCoy uses a Polanyian idiom to articulate his theological and ethical ideas. Polanyi's thought is the epistemological glove that snugly fits McCoy's federalist and Niebuhrian theological hand.
In a very straightforward way, McCoy has pointed out that he thinks Polanyi's thought introduces a new era in philosophy:
The critical period of Western philosophy, opened by Descartes and brought to its zenith in the Enlightenment, is coming to an end, and the post-critical era is emerging. Michael Polanyi, it appears to me, is the most important philosophic figure opening up this new direction and delineating its basic elements. Of the critical pretensions to have found a way, either through philosophic rationality or by means of scientific method, to a universal perspective, Polanyi points out that thinkers of the critical period have pursued "a mistaken ideal of objectivity" . . . . 9 After noting some forerunners in Peirce, Niebuhr, and federalist thought, McCoy affirms "Polanyi has brought the tendencies produced by problems of the critical perspective into systematic focus and pioneered a new epistemological method with imagination and comprehensiveness" ("PR", 34). What McCoy dubs the "Polanyian Revolution" ("PR", 35), he compares to the Copernican revolution, noting that Polanyi's new method appreciates the achievements and rigor of critical thought but transcends it and recovers (by recasting it) "the pre-critical appreciation of tradition, culture, and community" ("PR", 35).
McCoy's high esteem for Polanyi's work values both the critical and constructive thrusts of Polanyi's thought. Put into McCoy's own idiom, both the critical and constructive elements are concerned with location:
The Polanyian Revolution consists, first of all, in reminding us that knowing occurs within human locations and from perspectives shaped by these locations. Second, the Polanyian Revolution explores with delicacy and precision the epistemological meaning of human location that has implications for the entire spectrum of human knowing and action ("PR", 35).
The critical element of Polanyi's epistemology reveals the hubris involved in speaking, philosophically or theologically in the imperial mood as if we occupied an ontological peak. Polanyi's elucidation of the from/to structure of all knowing recasts knowing in post-critical perspective. It recontextualizes knowing and recovers the importance of our skills; it embeds knowing in the background of location and emphasizes the action involved in knowing. McCoy emphasizes that the fiduciary dimension of knowing is recovered. Humans rely upon elements from their social location, tradition, and community in order to affirm what they believe is knowledge. The pre-critical notions of "faith seeking understanding" and "believing in order to understand" take on new meaning as Polanyi sets forth the tacit component involved in critical knowing ("PR", 36).
Further, McCoy argues, Polanyi's account of knowing transforms the dualistic (knower and known) and individualistic approach enshrined in the critical tradition:
Post-Critical hermeneutics is triadic in structure, involving a knower rooted in culture and community, what is being interpreted within its context, and those for whom the interpretation is intended, who are also rooted in culture and community ("PR", 36).
Polanyi's approach also reorients the manner in which scientific, social scientific and philosophical thinking have considered reflection as either subjective or objective.
Finally, Polanyi's thought has in it an element found also in Niebuhrian, federal and Platonic thought: it reaches out to the unknown and is never satisfied with the status quo. The lure of the unknown beckons:
Heuristic passion, says Polanyi, empowers and guides the creative endeavors of humanity and impels humans to venture ceaselessly toward the new, toward the unknown. Thus human community lives ever on the verge of discovery, poised between the driving promise of past fulfillment and the magnetic anticipation of further fulfillment drawing us toward the promise of the future (WGC, 204-205).
Dwelling in, for Polanyi, is for the purpose of breaking out. It is just this double movement that McCoy finds perfectly captures his sense that human existence is a nomadic one:
Humans dwell in a world when they believe in its reality and live with commitment toward that reality. But living with creativity means dwelling in one's world with a passion which seeks beyond it. . . . .. Every human horizon proves temporary (WGC, 205).
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